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HUMANITARIAN PROTECTION ADVOCACY IN EAST ASIA: CHARTING A PATH 
FORWARD 
 
Andrew Wolman
*
 
 
Abstract: In this article, I make the following three-part argument. First, I claim that despite the 
fact that a far greater number of asylum-seekers in Japan, Korea and Mainland China receive 
humanitarian protection status than receive refugee status, legal advocacy regarding asylum in 
East Asia disproportionately focuses on refugee law and policy. Second, I argue that by 
neglecting a potentially productive advocacy framework, this disproportionate focus on refugee 
law has deleterious consequences for the development of robust and humane asylum systems in 
the region, and for the provision of asylum protection to the greatest number of individuals. 
Third, I assert that international law provides tools for effective humanitarian protection-based 
advocacy, and outline four avenues for legal advocacy which I believe can lay the groundwork 
for progressive reforms of humanitarian protection law and policy in East Asia. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
If there is one characteristic feature of asylum policies in Japan, Mainland China and the 
Republic of Korea (Korea),
1
 it is the reluctance of these countries to grant refugee status to 
significant numbers of asylum-seekers, despite the fact that each of these countries has ratified 
the Refugee Convention of 1951 and the Refugee Protocol of 1967.
2
 In each country a 
significantly greater number of asylum-seekers are granted humanitarian protection status 
(defined here as “formal permi[ssion], under national law, to reside in a country on humanitarian 
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 Japan, Korea and Mainland China are the three largest jurisdictions in East Asia and the most important asylum 
granting jurisdictions in the region. When I use the term ‘East Asia’ in this article, it is in reference to them only. 
Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan have different refugee policies than the rest of China, and will be addressed here 
only in passing. 
2
 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 UNTS 150, 28 Jul. 1951 (entry into force: 22 Apr. 1954); 
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, 606 UNTS 8791, 31 Jan. 1967 (entry into force: 4 Oct. 1967) 
(collectively, the ‘Refugee Convention’). 
 
 
grounds”3) than refugee status. This disparity has grown in recent years, as Syrian asylum-seeker 
have begun to enter the region in large numbers. 
Taking this disparity as my starting point, I make the following three-part argument in 
this article. First, I claim that despite the greater number of individuals who receive humanitarian 
status in the region, legal advocacy regarding asylum in East Asia disproportionately uses a 
framework based on the 1951 Refugee Convention to address issues of refugee law and policy 
rather than utilizing a humanitarian protection framework to promote stronger asylum policies. 
Second, I argue that by neglecting a potentially productive advocacy framework, this 
disproportionate focus on refugee law has deleterious consequences for the development of 
robust and humane asylum systems in the region, and for the provision of asylum protection to 
the greatest number of individuals. Third, I assert that international law provides tools for 
effective humanitarian protection-based advocacy, and outline four avenues for legal advocacy 
which I believe can lay the groundwork for progressive reforms of humanitarian protection law 
and policy in East Asia. 
While there have been some studies of humanitarian protection in East Asia in the native 
languages of the region, this is the first article on the subject in the English language, to the best 
of my knowledge.
4
 As such, it is intended to spark a wider discourse on the important but often 
overlooked issues related to humanitarian protection in the region. This paper can be generally 
placed within a tradition of critical thinking about asylum law, and specifically about the 
centrality of the 1951 Refugee Convention for legal advocacy. Some scholars, with David 
Kennedy perhaps most prominent among them, have argued that the focus on a refugee law 
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 See United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), Protecting Refugees: A Field Guide for NGOs, 
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 For Korean and Japanese-language introductions, see respectively, Bok Hee Chang, “국제인권법상 난민의 
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“日本における類似難民の保護の課題と展望―平等原則アプローチと EU Qualification 
Directiveの 2011年改正からの示唆―” [Problems with, and Future Prospects for, Complementary Protection in 
Japan: An Insight from the Principle of the Non-Discrimination Approach and the Revised 2011 EU Qualification 
Directive], International Public Policy Studies, 19(2), 2016, 37-53. 
 
 
framework “can make it more difficult to contest the closure of borders to economic migration.”5 
Martin Jones has likewise criticised a focus on the Refugee Convention for removing “from the 
debate alternate definitions of those to whom international protection is owed, including alternate 
definitions of “refugee” as well as the other human rights obligations owed to those seeking 
refuge by states.”6 My argument is different and more context-specific. I claim that in the current 
East Asian context, an increased focus on humanitarian protection-based advocacy has the 
potential to improve the lives of more people and is more likely to lead to beneficial law and 
policy reforms than is a continuation of the current level of focus on Refugee Convention-based 
legal advocacy. In this respect, my article both supports and builds upon the recent academic 
agenda-setting work of Elaine Lynn-Ee Ho, Laura Madokoro and Glen Peterson, who argue that 
academics must look beyond the Refugee Convention to explore the multiplicity of regimes 
affecting asylum-seekers in Asia, in order to explore their impact, gaps, and potentialities.
7
  
2. ASYLUM IN EAST ASIA: THE LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Japan, China and Korea are all State parties to the Refugee Convention and Protocol. Japan’s 
ratification was the earliest, in 1981.
8
 The following year, Japan integrated the Refugee 
Convention into its domestic legislation, through revisions of its 1951 Immigration Control 
Order.
9
 Japan’s engagement with the international refugee regime at this time was a direct 
response to pressures stemming from the Indochinese refugee crisis of the late 1970s and 
1980s.
10
 In 2004, Japan updated its regulations through a revised Immigration Control and 
Refugee Recognition Act; this law, as further amended several times in the interim, now forms 
the backbone of Japanese refugee policy.
11
 In 2010, Japan also introduced a pilot refugee 
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 David Kennedy, “Reassessing International Humanitarianism: The Dark Sides”, in Anne Orford (ed.), 
International Law and its Others Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008, 131-155, 134. 
6
 Martin Jones, “Moving Beyond Protection Space: Developing a Law of Asylum in South-East Asia”, in James 
Simeon (ed.), The UNHCR and the Supervision of International Refugee Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 75-96, 89. 
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 Osamu Arakaki, Refugee Law and Practice in Japan, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2008, 19. 
9
 Ibid. 
10
 Ibid., 16-17. The Indochinese refugee crisis refers to a series of mass migrations from Vietnam, Laos and 
Cambodia in the years following the end of the Vietnam War as a result of conflict, persecution and geopolitical 
turmoil in the region. See, W. Courtland Robinson, Terms of Refuge: The Indochinese Exodus and the International 
Response, London, Zed Books, 1998. 
11
 Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act, Cabinet Order No. 319 of 4 October 1951 (as amended).   
 
 
resettlement program in 2010, which resettled 86 refugees from Myanmar during the ensuing 
four years.
12
   
Mainland China acceded to the Refugee Convention a year after Japan, in 1982.
13
 As 
with Japan, this took place in the shadow of the Indochinese refugee crisis, which saw China 
emerge as an important destination country for those fleeing violence against ethnic Chinese in 
Southeast Asia.
14
 China provides for the possibility of granting political asylum in article 32 of 
its constitution,
15
 but has not yet enacted domestic laws or regulations for refugee recognition.
16
 
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) does have an office in Beijing, 
however, which is authorised to make refugee status determinations,
17
 and the 2012 Exit-Entry 
Law allows asylum-seekers remain in the country during UNHCR’s screening of their 
applications.
18
  
Korea, meanwhile, ratified the Refugee Convention in 1992, shortly after joining the 
United Nations, and integrated provisions for refugee recognition into its Immigration Control 
Act in 1993.
19
 However Korea did not recognise its first refugee until 2001.
20
 Around this time, 
Korea made the first steps towards operationalising its commitments, with the assistance of 
UNHCR, although the number of refugees recognised remained quite small.
21
 In 2009, the 
Immigration Control Act was revised to, inter alia, provide that refugees should be treated in line 
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 Atsushi Kondo, “Migration and law in Japan”, Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies, 2(1), 2015, 155–168, 161-162. 
13
 Lili Song, “Who Shall We Help? The Refugee Definition in a Chinese Context” Refugee Survey Quarterly, 33(1), 
2014, 44-58, 45. The scope of the Convention was later extended to include Macau, but not Hong Kong. Brian 
Barbour, “Protection in practice: The situation of refugees in East Asia”, Nanmin Kenkyu Journal [Refugee Studies 
Journal], 2, 2012, 81-92, 88. (2012)  [Published in Japanese; English original available at: 
http://www.refugeestudies.jp/]. 
14
 Song, “Who Shall We Help?”, 45. China had accepted 260,000 Indochinese refugees during 1978-1979 and 
resettled an additional 2,500 Lao and Cambodian refugees in 1981-1982. UNHCR, The People’s Republic of China 
Factsheet, Dec. 2016, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/5000187d9.pdf (last visited 25 Dec. 2016). 
15
 Xianfa [Constitution] art. 32, § 2 (1982), 2004 Fagui Huibian 4–28. 
16
 The Ministry of Civil Affairs has reportedly been working on drafting regulations for refugee status determination 
since 2013, but no details of this process have been made public. Cui Jia, “Refugees Look to End Life in Limbo”, 
China Daily, 29 Dec. 2015, available at http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015-12/29/content_22849660.htm 
(last visited 25 Dec. 2016). By contrast, Hong Kong and Macau do have laws and procedures in place to recognise 
refugees. See Lei n.º 1/2004, Regime de reconhecimento e perda do estatuto de refugiado (Macau); Government of 
Hong Kong, “Commencement of Unified Screening Mechanism for Claims for Non-Refoulement Protection”, 
available at: http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201402/07/P201402070307.htm (last visited 25 Dec. 2016). 
17
 Song, “Who Shall We Help?”, 51. 
18
 Chujing Rujing Guanli Fa [Exit and Entry Administration Law] (Exit and Entry Law) (promulgated by the 
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC), June 30, 2012, effective July 1, 2013), 2012 Fagui 
Huibian 283–301, article 46. 
19
 Law No. 4592 (10 Dec. 1993) (amended version of the Immigration Control Act, Law No. 1289 on Mar. 5, 1963). 
20
 Andrew Wolman, “Korea’s Refugee Act: A Critical Evaluation under International Law”, Journal of East Asia 
and International Law, 6(2), 2013, 479–95, 481. 
21
 Chan Un Park, "Refugees and Korean Practices Thereof, Kanagawa Hogaku 40, 2007, 1-9, 4.  
 
 
with the requirements of the Refugee Convention.
22
 In response to pressure from civil society 
groups, a new Refugee Act was passed by the National Assembly in 2011, and entered into force 
on July 1, 2013.
23
 This Act established a new refugee determination process and specifies that 
asylum claims to be filed from ports of entry.
24
 It also outlines a new appeals process, whereby 
denials, cancellations and withdrawals of refugee status may be appealed to the Minister of 
Justice within 30 days.
25
 In addition, the Refugee Act established a fifteen-member Refugee 
Committee to review appeals from asylum denials or cancellations and provides for greater 
protections for the welfare of recognised refugees.
26
  
Despite each country’s ratification of the Refugee Convention and Japan and Korea’s 
creation of a domestic law framework for refugee determinations, the number of individuals 
recognised as refugees in China, Japan and Korea is very low. According to the Japanese 
Ministry of Justice, during the year 2015, there were 7,586 applications for refugee status in 
Japan, and 27 refugees recognised.
27
 According to UNHCR statistics for 2015, there were 11,584 
applications for refugee status in Korea, with 24 refugees recognised and 488 applications for 
refugee status in mainland China, with 39 refugees recognised.
28
 Thus, there were, in total, 90 
refugees recognised in the East Asian region in 2015. This is evidently quite a small number, 
when compared to the total population of the region (slightly more than 1.5 billion people in 
2016) or its economic capacity. It is also a small number when compared to the estimated 
                                                          
22
 Law No. 9142, arts. 76-78(1) (19 Dec. 2008) (amending the Immigration Control Act, Law No. 1289 (Mar. 5, 
1963)). 
23
 Law No. 11298 (proclaimed Feb. 10, 2012, enforced July 1, 2013). 
24
 Id. art. 6. 
25
 Id. art. 21. 
26
 Id. arts. 21, 25, 31-37. 
27
 Japan Association for Refugees, “Number of people granted refugee status in Japan in 2015: Preliminary figures 
from the Ministry of Justice”, available at: https://www.refugee.or.jp/jar/news/2016/02/01-0000.shtml (last visited 
27 Dec. 2016). 
28
 Data downloaded from the UNHCR Population Statistics Database (http://popstats.unhcr.org) on 15 October, 
2016. The refugee recognition rates are no better in Hong Kong and Macau. Under the new unified government 
screening procedure for both refugee claims and torture claims, 3,165 asylum-seekers were screened by the Hong 
Kong authorities between March 2014 and December 2015, only 18 of whom were granted asylum. Raquel 
Carvalho, “Hong Kong’s Refugee Claim System Leaves Many Tough Questions”, South China Morning Post, 28 
Feb. 2016, available at: http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/law-crime/article/1918025/hong-kongs-refugee-
claim-system-leaves-many-tough-questions (last visited 27 Dec. 2016). Meanwhile in Macau, there have reportedly 
not been any refugees recognised between 2004 and June 2014, despite the existence of a domestic legal framework 
for refugee recognition.  “Seis pedidos de asilo em Macau onde estatuto de refugiado continua a ser uma miragem”, 
Sapo Noticias, 20 June, 2014, available at  http://noticias.sapo.tl/portugues/lusa/artigo/17890926.html (last visited 
27 Dec. 2016). 
 
 
number of refugees in the world (21.3 million, in December, 2016).
29
 This low number of 
refugees is not a temporary phenomenon; the number of refugees recognised has been 
consistently tiny in all these jurisdictions (although the large number of refugee recognition 
applications in Japan and Korea is somewhat of a recent phenomenon).
30
 
Meanwhile, Korea and Japan have also developed domestic procedures for granting 
asylum without acknowledging refugee status. While this alternative status goes by different 
terms in each country, it is generally translated as ‘humanitarian status’ in Japan and Korea.31 
Although humanitarian status is awarded based on uncertain criteria, in many cases it has been 
used to provide protection to people fleeing war zones, such as Syria.
32
 China has no general 
regulations on humanitarian protection, but in practice has provided protective non-refugee 
documentation to asylum-seekers at times, or tolerated their undocumented stay.
33
 In all three 
countries, more people are granted humanitarian status than refugee status. In Korea, 522 
asylum-seekers have been granted refugee status between 1994 and August 2015, while 879 
individuals were granted humanitarian status during that time.
34
  In Japan, 2,434 asylum-seekers 
were granted special protection on humanitarian grounds between 1994 and the end of 2015, 
while only 466 were recognised as refugees.
35
 Although precise numbers are difficult to come by, 
                                                          
29
 UNHCR, “Figures at a Glance”, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html (last visited 27 Dec. 
2016). 
30
 Barbour, “Protection in practice”, 91-92. 
31
 The Japanese term commonly used for humanitarian status is人道的配慮による在留特別許可 (or 人道的地位) 
and the Korean term is 인도적 지위.   
32
 Adam Taylor, “Japan Has Accepted Only Six Syrian Refugees: Meet One of Them.”, Washington Post, 27 Oct. 
2016, available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/the-singular-life-of-a-syrian-refugee-in-
japan/2016/10/26/be0c6699-09f3-4a05-abeb-cad076b4cc02_story.html (last visited 29 Dec. 2016) (“almost all 
Syrians are allowed to temporarily stay in Japan for humanitarian reasons, even if they are not granted refugee 
status”); Paula Hancocks and KJ Kwon, “Syrian Refugees Stuck in Limbo at Seoul Airport”, CNN, 2 June 2016, at 
http://edition.cnn.com/2016/06/01/asia/south-korea-airport-syrians/ (last visited 29 Dec. 2016) (668 Syrians granted 
humanitarian status from 2014 to June 2016). Syrians are now permitted to stay in Korea with humanitarian status 
without going through the usual refugee determination process. Heinn Shin, “Syrian Car Mechanic Struggles to Ply 
his Trade in the Safe Haven of Seoul”, UNHCR, 24 Mar. 2015, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2015/3/551188109/syrian-car-mechanic-struggles-ply-trade-safe-haven-seoul.html 
(last visited 29 Dec. 2016). 
33
 Guofu Liu, Chinese Immigration Law, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2016, 90-92 (noting occasional tolerance and 
provision of documentation to North Korean women in China, despite lack of regulations on humanitarian 
protection); Song, “Who Shall We Help?”, 55 (discussing temporary protection of 2009 Kokang influx and 2011 
Kachin influx of refugees from Myamar). 
34
 Sarah Kim, “Korea’s Borders Crack Open for Refugees”, Joongang Daily, 16 Nov. 2015, available at 
http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/Article.aspx?aid=3011575 (last visited 29 Dec. 2016). 
35
 Japan Ministry of Justice, “我が国における難民庇護の状況等” [Status of Refugee Protection in Japan], sched. 
3, available at: http://www.moj.go.jp/content/001179573.pdf (last visited 29 Dec. 2016). 
 
 
it is clear that thousands of asylum-seekers have been given protection in China in recent years 
without being given refugee status.
36
  
3. ASYLUM ADVOCACY IN EAST ASIA 
Despite the fact that more people are granted humanitarian status than refugee status in the 
region, asylum advocacy in East Asia is far more focused on refugee law than on the law of 
humanitarian protection.  For local NGOs, this is evident from their names and mandates. For 
example, the Japan Association for Refugees assists and advocates for the rights of asylum-
seekers and refugees, which it explicitly defines according to the Refugee Convention.
37
 
International NGOs tend to use the Refugee Convention as a framework for their critiques, and 
often focus on the low recognition rate in Japan and Korea.
38
 International organisations such as 
UNHCR regularly criticise Japanese, Chinese and Korean refugee policies, but less frequently 
discuss each country’s humanitarian protection programs, except in a favourable sense (i.e., 
explaining the lack of refugee recognition by the fact that governments utilise an alternative 
humanitarian status).
39
 With certain exceptions, even academic studies tend to focus on refugee 
law and policy rather than humanitarian status law and policy.
40
 To the best of my knowledge, 
there is not a single English-language academic article on humanitarian status in East Asia, while 
there are numerous studies of refugee law and policies in the region, many of which take an 
explicitly advocacy oriented perspective, oftentimes by pointing out how national policies 
conflict with the Refugee Convention and how they should be brought into compliance.  
 This predilection for refugee law-based advocacy can perhaps best be illustrated with 
three examples. First, there is the issue of protection for North Korean escapees in China. Even 
though China has no domestic refugee law and there is little chance of it recognising North 
                                                          
36
 Song, “Who Shall We Help?”, 55. 
37
  Japan Association for Refugees, “Refugees and JAR”, available at: https://www.refugee.or.jp/en/#02 (last visited 
29 Dec. 2016). 
38
 See, e.g., Amnesty International, “Japan 2015-2016”, available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/asia-
and-the-pacific/japan/report-japan/ (last visited 29 Dec. 2016); “Amnesty slams Japan’s contentious secrecy law, 
low acceptance of refugees”, Japan Times, 24 Feb. 2016, available at: 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/02/24/national/social-issues/amnesty-hits-japans-contentious-secrecy-law-
low-acceptance-refugees/ (last visited 29 Dec. 2016). 
39
 See, e.g., Alex Martin, “UNHCR Exec Lauds Refugee Strides, Urges More”, Japan Times, 6 July, 2011, available 
at:  http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2011/07/06/national/unhcr-exec-lauds-refugee-strides-urges-more/ (last 
visited 29 Dec. 2016); Masamo Ito, “Japan Helps Too Few Refugees: UNHCR Chief”, Japan Times, 18 Nov. 2014, 
available at: http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/11/18/national/japan-helps-too-few-refugees-unhcr-chief/ (last 
visited 29 Dec. 2016). 
40
 Elaine Lynn-Ee Ho et al, “Refugees, Displacement and Forced Migration in Asia”, 14 (criticising “the 
preponderance of research on the 1951 Convention and UNHCR”). 
 
 
Korean escapees as refugees, the international community has often focused its advocacy on 
encouraging China to fulfill its obligations under the Refugee Convention. For example, the 
European Parliament recently urged China “in accordance with its obligations as a state party to 
the UN Refugee Convention, not to deny North Korean refugees who cross the border into China 
their right to seek asylum or to forcibly return them to North Korea”41 and the US Congressional-
Executive Commission on China stated that “[t]he Chinese government is obligated under the 
1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Convention) and its 1967 Protocol 
to refrain from repatriating North Koreans who left the DPRK for fear of persecution or who fear 
persecution upon return to the DPRK.”42 International NGOs likewise focused on the refugee 
convention. According to Human Rights Watch, China “defies its commitments to respect the 
1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol -- both which were ratified by 
China in 1982 -- by denying North Koreans the right to seek protection from UNHCR and seek 
determination of their refugee claims, ”43 while Amnesty International’s position is that “all 
North Koreans in China are entitled to refugee status because of threat of human rights violations 
if they were to be returned to North Korea against their will.” 44  One notable exception is 
UNHCR itself, which has at times used the Refugee Convention to frame its advocacy on this 
issue, but has also been active in promoting other ‘humanitarian’ solutions.45 
 A second example of the focus on refugee law-based advocacy was the debate 
surrounding the drafting of Korea’s Refugee Act of 2013. At the time of the law’s drafting and 
passage, there were numerous analyses of whether the act fulfilled Korea’s requirements under 
the Refugee Convention, from academics,
46
 practitioners,
47
 and UNHCR.
48
 However, there was 
                                                          
41
 European Parliament, “European Parliament Resolution on North Korea” (2016/2521(RSP)), par. 8. 
42
 Congressional Executive Commission on China, “Annual Report”, 2013, 118, available at: 
http://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/AR13DJ.PDF (last visited 25 Dec. 2016). 
43
 Phil Robertson, Deputy Director, Asia Division, Human Rights Watch “The Problem of North Korean Refugees 
in China and Possible Solutions”, speech at 2nd KINU Chaillot Human Rights Forum 2012 , 14 June 2012, available 
at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/07/19/problem-north-korean-refugees-china-and-possible-solutions (last visited 
27 Dec. 2016). 
44
 T. Kumar, International Advocacy Director Amnesty International, USA , “China's Repatriation of North Korean 
Refugees”, presentation before the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 5 Mar. 2012, available at: 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/news-item/china-s-repatriation-of-north-korean-refugees (last visited 27 Dec. 
2016). 
45
 Roberta Cohen, “Human Rights and the North Korean Refugee Crisis”, Brookings Institution, On the Record Blog, 
25 Oct. 2007, available at: https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/human-rights-and-the-north-korea-refugee-
crisis/ (last visited 27 Dec. 2016) (“UNHCR has been proposing a special humanitarian status for North Koreans in 
China to increase their protection”). 
46
 Hyun Im, “An Evaluation of Korea’s New Refugee Act and Future Challenges”, Korea Observer, 43(4), Winter 
2012, 587-615; Moon-Hyun Koh, “A Study on Refugee Status Determination Criteria and Procedures of Korea’s 
 
 
very little analysis of the new law using humanitarian protection frameworks, even though the 
law covers humanitarian status as well as refugee status and, as mentioned above, more people 
have been granted humanitarian status in Korea than have been granted refugee status. 
Unsurprisingly, the protections for humanitarian status holders (and applicants) in the law ended 
up being weak and largely discretionary. 
 A third example has been the recent focus in the international media on the low refugee 
recognition rate for Syrians in Japan. In fact, most Syrian asylum-seekers are given humanitarian 
protection. There is a need for greater attention to their well-being within Japan, and ensuring 
that their rights are protected and that they have access to needed employment and services. 
However, the media focus has largely been to upbraid Japan for the low refugee recognition rate 
for Syrian asylum-seekers, instead of these other issues.
49
  
Of course, this focus on an international refugee law framework is neither unusual nor 
unexplainable. Asylum advocacy in most of the world focuses on refugee law and the Refugee 
Convention.
50
 The Refugee Convention is a powerful and well-known normative document, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Refugee Act”, paper presented at World Congress of Constitutional Law 2014, June 2014, available at: 
https://www.jus.uio.no/english/research/news-and-events/events/conferences/2014/wccl-cmdc/wccl/papers/ws6/w6-
moonhyun.pdf (last visited 27 Dec. 2016). 
47
 Seongsoo Kim, “One Year After the Korean Refugee Act”, RefLaw, 7 Jan. 2015, available at: 
http://www.reflaw.org/one-year-after-the-korean-refugee-act/ (last visited 27 Dec. 2016). 
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 UNHCR, “UNHCR's Comments on the Draft Presidential Decree and Regulations to the Refugee Act of the 
Republic of Korea”, 26 March 2013, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/54100f8f4.html (last visited 27 
Dec. 2016). Similarly, UNHCR only addressed humanitarian protection in three out of the 37 paragraphs of advice it 
gave to the Japanese government regarding the proposed 2004 reforms of its Immigration Control and Refugee 
Recognition Act. UNHCR, “UNHCR's Comments on the Bill to Reform the Immigration Control and Refugee 
Recognition Act of Japan”, 19 May 2004, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/42b7f4894.html (last visited 
27 Dec. 2016). 
49
 See, e.g., Justin McCurry, “Japan Takes no Syrian Refugees Yet, Despite Giving 200m to Fight ISIS”, The 
Guardian, 9 Sep. 2015, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/09/japan-takes-no-syrian-
refugees-yet-despite-giving-200m-to-help-fight-isis (last visited 25 Dec. 2016); Anna Fifield, “As Europe Makes 
Room for Refugees, Some in Japan Ask Why Not Us?”, Washington Post, 8 Sep. 2015, available at: 
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which provides a widely accepted set of standards for making legal arguments.  Western NGOs, 
academics and policy-makers are familiar with the Convention through its implementation in the 
West, and indeed many asylum advocates in Asia are quite familiar with the refugee law 
framework due to their education in Western countries where refugee law has long played a 
more prominent role in national policy. Nor is there a total neglect of alternative protection 
frameworks. For example, South Korean advocates and policy-makers rarely if ever view North 
Koreans through the lens of the Refugee Convention (because North Koreans are considered to 
be citizens of South Korea under that nation’s domestic laws).51 The Korean National Human 
Rights Commission has challenged the lack of rights for humanitarian status holders in Korea on 
occasion, while using treaty law to fortify its arguments.
52
 Some Japanese academics and 
advocates have started to focus their attention more on improving the legal framework for 
humanitarian status over the past few years.
53
 These are the exceptions to the rule, however. 
4. IMPLICATIONS 
This disproportionate attention to refugee law might not matter, if refugee law advocacy 
was more likely than humanitarian status advocacy to successfully prompt positive legal change 
that affects large numbers of individuals. But, this is not the case, for several reasons. First, as 
discussed above, refugee law-based advocacy affects a much smaller number of people than 
humanitarian status advocacy. Of course, one could argue that this disparity shows the need to 
pressure for more refugee recognition, and perhaps this is true. However, domestic and external 
sources have been advocating for a more liberal attitude towards refugee recognition for decades 
with little or no success. There is no reason to believe that future advocacy along these lines will 
be more productive. 
Second, to the limited extent that one can predict future forced migration patterns, it 
seems likely that East Asia will see an even greater proportion of migrants seeking humanitarian 
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status rather than refugee status in the near future. This is due to the likelihood that climate 
change is going to result in significant displacement in the Asia-Pacific region, coming in 
particular from low-lying areas of developing countries in South and Southeast Asia.
54
 While 
there is uncertainty regarding the numbers, timing, and destinations for these migrants, it seems 
likely that many will end up attempting to come to the relatively wealthy and less affected 
countries of East Asia. Climate change induced migrants are not normally though to qualify as 
refugees under the Refugee Convention definition, however, meaning that they will have to rely 
on humanitarian protection policies if they are to obtain protection.
55
 
Third, there is more room for plausible improvement in humanitarian status laws and 
regulations, while the easy advocacy gains have been made for refugee law. Put simply, the laws 
and regulations regarding recognition and treatment of refugees are – on paper – already fairly 
adequate in Japan and Korea, and although China still lacks domestic refugee laws, it has also 
proven relatively impervious to external or internal advocacy on this issue. Thus from a refugee 
law perspective, the improvements that need to be made in Japan and Korea are more related to 
the inordinately skeptical attitudes of Justice Ministry officials and judges, but this is 
complicated by the fact that bureaucratic and judicial attitudes are difficult to reform through 
conventional civil society advocacy. On the other hand, there are significant law and policy 
improvements that can be plausibly advocated for in the realm of humanitarian protection in the 
region. As will be discussed in more depth in the next chapter, humanitarian protection policies 
lack transparency, do not adequately protect human rights, and improperly discriminate between 
similarly situated persons.  
Fourth, there is at least some reason to believe that humanitarian protection-based asylum 
arguments might resonate more than refugee law-based arguments within East Asia. According 
to Payne, “new ideas are said to ‘resonate’ because of some ideational affinity to other already 
accepted normative frameworks.”56 Some have argued that refugee reception concepts have little 
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cultural resonance in East Asia.
57
 Sara Davies argues that non-Western understanding were 
largely ignored in the drafting process, thus systematically excluding Asian States from the 
construction of international refugee law.
58
 Therefore, refugee law is sometimes seen as a 
Western import, imposed on Asian nations that did not traditionally embrace the concept.
59
 As 
such, refugee reception norms arguably lack the legitimacy necessary to prompt compliance with 
international norms out of a sense or moral obligation.
60
 
On the other hand, humanitarian protection advocacy can tap into long-standing and 
powerful traditions of humanitarianism in Northeast Asia that are not perceived to exist with 
respect to refugee protection. Humanitarian values are “deeply embedded in East Asia’s social, 
cultural and religious traditions,” 61  and have deep roots in both Buddhist and Confucian 
thought.
62
 Traditionally, in the Chinese socio-cultural system, a dynasty’s “ruling legitimacy 
came to be predicated upon the fulfilment of its humanitarian obligations, defined in terms of an 
overarching duty to mitigate the suffering of others.” 63  Humanitarian ideals have also long 
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played a prominent role in Japanese political philosophy, dating back to the Japanese feudal 
era.
64
  
Humanitarian values retain their relevance in the region today, too, although such notions 
have evolved with globalisation to reflect a more cosmopolitan worldview.
65
 For example, 
humanitarian principles influence the foreign aid programs of Korea and Japan, as well as the 
growing Chinese concern with projecting an image of “responsible great power”.66 Humanitarian 
ideals also pervade the idea of ‘human security’, a concept which has distinct Asian roots67 and 
has been primarily promoted by Japan as a worthwhile approach to international relations, 
including in the refugee arena.
68
 On those few occasions of mass influxes of forced migrants in 
the post-war era, East Asian countries themselves have preferred to use the language of 
humanitarianism to characterise their responses.
69
 
Fifth, humanitarian protection holds promise as a way for East Asian countries to provide 
needed protection while avoiding sensitive political judgments on their neighbours’ actions. 
While in principle, awarding refugee status is not considered an unfriendly act,
70
 in practice 
China has often used political and economic pressure to attempt (often successfully) to dissuade 
its neighbours from granting asylum to Chinese nationals.
71
 Thus, the Japanese and Korean 
governments have traditionally avoided giving refugee status to Chinese asylum-seekers, in order 
to avoid political complications in an already fraught relationship.
72
 China, also, would find it 
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politically awkward to give refugee status to persecuted North Koreans, given that North Korea 
is a close ally. While it would of course be optimal for governments in the region to ignore 
politics in their consideration of refugee policy, advocates may be able to productively call for 
humanitarian status as a second-best solution, until that happens.   
5. INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORK  
Given that there appears to be a need for increased humanitarian protection advocacy as a means 
to protect asylum-seekers in East Asia, the final question I will address in this article is how 
international legal standards can be used to improve national policies related to humanitarian 
status. After all, there is no international treaty on humanitarian protection (like the Refugee 
Convention) that can easily be used to evaluate a country’s policies and condemn violations. 
Here I will outline four avenues for advocacy that may prove useful in the region, along with 
specific problems that they can be used to address. 
5.1.Lack of Substantive Protection against Refoulement 
First, advocates can argue that some individuals are not being granted humanitarian status in East 
Asia even though they are entitled to receive protection against refoulement under international 
law. There are a number of different treaties that protect against refoulement in cases where the 
asylum-seeker may face torture or have their life threatened in their home country.
73
  Most 
notably, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (Convention against Torture) provides that ‘[n]o State Party shall expel, return 
(“refouler”) or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for 
believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture’.74 China, Japan, and Korea are 
all parties to this convention. The International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
does not explicitly contain a non-refoulement obligation, but the Human Rights Committee 
(among others) has repeatedly emphasised that the treaty implicitly prohibits States from sending 
persons back to countries where they could be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or 
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degrading treatment or punishment or a violation of their right to life.
75
 In some cases, the 
Human Rights Committee has extended the non-refoulement obligation to protect against all 
potential ICCPR violations.
76
 The ICCPR has been ratified by Japan and Korea, and signed but 
not ratified by China (although it has been deemed applicable in Hong Kong).  
For children, the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), which has been ratified 
by all East Asian countries, protects against violations of the right to life (article 6) and torture or 
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (article 37).
77
 The CRC Committee 
has interpreted these provisions as providing a non-refoulement obligation.
78
 Many experts 
would go a step further to argue that the article 1 requirement to act in the best interests of the 
child prohibits the refoulement of children in some circumstances.
79
 Although less widely 
accepted, much the same argument regarding non-refoulement could be made for other treaties, 
such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).
80
 
It seems clear that in Japan, Korea and China, many individuals in fact merit protection 
under these treaties but do not receive it from the government. At the individual level, these 
cases should receive attention from advocates, just like improper denials of refugee status. At the 
more systematic level, advocates can press for non-discretionary laws that prohibit the denial of 
asylum to those who are entitled to it under international human rights law. In China, such laws 
do not yet exist; there are no regulations in place for the protection of individuals in danger of 
torture or violations of the right to life in their home country.
81
 Such laws could bring great 
benefits to North Korean escapees and Kachin refugees from Myanmar, who are currently at risk 
for refoulement.
82
 In Korea, there is some lack of clarity in the relevant regulations, but 
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according to a plain reading of the Refugee Law Enactment Ordinance, the provision of 
humanitarian status appears to be treated as a purely discretionary act.
83
 In Japan there has since 
2009 been statutory protection against refoulement where there are substantial grounds for 
believing that the individual would be subjected to torture in the destination country.
84
 In other 
cases protection for non-refugees has traditionally been considered purely discretionary, based 
on undisclosed “special reasons”.85  
5.2.Lack of Procedural Protections against Refoulement 
Second, advocates can work towards ensuring that the procedures for receiving humanitarian 
status in East Asia follow basic due process requirements and show transparency. As Linda Kirk 
and others have noted, procedural barriers can in practice often be as significant as 
jurisprudential barriers to declining asylum claims, or even more so.
86
 Without adequate 
procedural protections, individuals who merit protection under the human rights treaties 
discussed above will in fact be unlawfully denied asylum. One can also make an argument that 
article 13 of the ICCPR independently imposes obligations upon States to guarantee access to a 
humanitarian status determination procedure, provide for an appeals process in cases of first-
instance denials, and guarantee free legal assistance to asylum-seekers.
87
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In practice, however, there are few procedural protections for humanitarian status seekers 
in the region. One cannot appeal a denial of humanitarian protection in either Japan or Korea.
88
 
Lack of transparency in judgments is a related problem; after all, it is difficult to effectively 
make a case for humanitarian protection if one does not know the criteria for receiving it. In 
Japan, there has traditionally been ‘little accessible information on the recent exercise of the 
discretion [in humanitarian status decisions], and even when the discretion is exercised in favour 
of an applicant, substantive reasons for permission are not provided.’ 89  However, this has 
reportedly been changed by 2015 policy revisions requiring judges to provide reasons for 
positive humanitarian status determinations.
90
 In addition, the Refugee Examination Counselors 
that are mandated to assist in refugee status appeals processes in Japan are not required to 
provide advice or guidance on humanitarian status, although some do so regardless.
91
 In Korea, 
there is a similar fundamental uncertainty regarding when humanitarian status is awarded,
92
 and 
it is even ‘unclear whether the dangers from which the humanitarian protection regime aims to 
protect should be limited to those in the Torture Convention or expanded to cover all sorts of 
other forms of persecution as well.’93  
This lack of clarity is also evident in China’s treatment of asylum-seekers. While article 
15 of the Law on the Control of Exit and Entry of Aliens states that “[a]liens who seek asylum 
for political reasons will be permitted to reside in China upon approval by the competent 
authorities of the Chinese Government”, there is “no clarification as to what might meet the 
requirements set by the competent Chinese government authorities”.94 Nor are there any laws 
specifying the type of visa asylum recipients will receive, and whether they will receive a 
residence permit, work permit, or any benefits.
95
  
5.3. Rights of Individuals with Humanitarian Protection Status 
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Third, advocates can employ international law-based arguments to press for improved treatment 
to the hundreds of people who have been awarded humanitarian status already. International law 
places certain obligations on States regarding the treatment of humanitarian status holders. These 
obligations stem from international human rights law for all humanitarian status holders, as 
discussed below. Certain obligations also stem from international refugee law for individuals 
who are awarded humanitarian protection status despite actually being refugees according to 
international law (which is not an uncommon practice in the region).
96
 This would entail (among 
other obligations) that they receive “the same treatment with respect to public relief and 
assistance as is accorded to their nationals”97 and “the most favourable treatment accorded to 
nationals of a foreign country in the same circumstances, as regards the right to engage in wage-
earning employment”.98 Finally, it is worth noting that human rights arguments can of course be 
made based on domestic constitutional norms as well, and in some cases this may in fact be the 
more effective route for advocacy.
99
 
While virtually the entire corpus of international human rights law is applicable to all 
humanitarian status holders (as it is to all individuals regardless of immigration status),
100
 
arguably the two most significant human rights treaties in this context are the ICESCR and the 
CRC, each of which has been ratified by China, Korea and Japan. The ICESCR protects the right 
to work, right to housing, right to social security, right to health care, and right to education, 
among other provisions. The CRC also protects the right to education, and generally obliges 
States to protect the rights of parents and children to live together as a family.
101
 In the specific 
context of immigration entry, the CRC states that “applications by a child or his or her parents to 
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enter or leave a State Party for the purpose of family reunification shall be dealt with by States 
Parties in a positive, humane and expeditious manner.”102 
These rights are threatened across East Asia. With the exception of Indochinese refugees 
(from the 1970s-1980s), China does not generally provide work permits or social security for 
either recognised refugees or other foreigners who are formally or informally allowed to stay in 
the country.
103
 In Korea, the Ministry of Justice “may provide a humanitarian status holder with 
employment activity permission’. 104   In practice, however, it has often been difficult for 
humanitarian workers to find work legally. Until recently, humanitarian status holders were 
required to submit an employment contract to the Ministry of Justice to decide whether or not to 
provide permission, and were only granted permits of a maximum of six months duration.
105
 
Thus, few employers were willing to offer an employment contract to someone who may or may 
not then be able to obtain legal permission to work, and even if they were, would only be given a 
working permit for such a short time.
106
 Now, however, the regulations have been changed to 
allow work permits to be granted without a signed contract, allowing for a maximum duration of 
one year.
107
 While this should improve the ability of humanitarian status holders to find work, 
there is reportedly still considerable reluctance among employers to hire humanitarian status 
holders, given their lack of familiarity with the current regulations.
108
 In addition, Korean 
humanitarian status holders receive hardly any social security, lack a right to basic education, are 
denied access to regional health insurance, and are not allowed to bring their children into the 
country, if they are parents of minors.
109
 While Japanese humanitarian status holders have a 
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somewhat more favorable legal situation, they too are unable to reunify with family until their 
immigration status changes to long-term of permanent resident, and are denied housing, language 
and employment support that may be necessary for their economic and social rights to be fully 
realised.
110
  
5.4. Discrimination between Humanitarian Status Holders and Refugees 
Finally, it is possible for advocates to argue that the differential treatment of refugees and 
humanitarians status holders, despite their identical material circumstances in all relevant 
respects, is a violation of the anti-discrimination mandate of the ICCPR, which states that “the 
law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection 
against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status”.111 This argument has 
been outlined most prominently by Jason Pobjoy,
112
 and has been embraced in various forms by 
a number of other scholars and commentators.
113
 Equality of treatment between refugees and 
humanitarian status holders has long been an objective of asylum advocates in the west, and has 
been attained, or very nearly so, in several countries.
114
 In the East Asian context, the equal 
treatment of refugees and humanitarian status holders is of particular importance in order to 
avoid the State’s temptation to simply award asylum applicants humanitarian status (and deny 
refugee status) as a means of maintaining flexibility and lowering costs, with the knowledge that 
appeal of the refugee status denial is very unlikely.
115
  
In Korea and Japan, however, there is significant discrimination between refugees and 
humanitarian status holders. In Korea, as discussed above, the current law provides only one 
discretionary article allowing the Ministry of Justice to provide humanitarian status holders with 
permission to work, in contrast to articles 30-38, which provide for a much wider range of rights 
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to refugees, some of which are phrased in obligatory terms.
116
 Interestingly, the first draft of the 
2013 Korean Refugee Act did provide for equal treatment between humanitarian status holders 
and recognised refugees, but this provision had disappeared by the time that the law was 
passed.
117
 In Japan, there is also preferential treatment for humanitarian status holders in certain 
respects, such as the ease of obtaining permanent residence, access to settlement services, and 
availability of family reunification.
118
 In addition, humanitarian status holders lack a legal 
guarantee of non-refoulement, unlike those with refugee status.
119
 
In China, there is relatively equal treatment of individuals with and without refugee status: 
in neither case are asylees generally granted the right to work, access government services, or 
travel freely.
120
 One area of discrimination is in education; refugees have been given equal 
access to Chinese school on the same conditions as Chinese nationals,
121
 while Kachin asylees 
(for example) were not allowed to access local schools.
122
 In the Chinese context, a somewhat 
different example of discrimination can be seen in the unequal treatment of Indochinese refugees 
and all others who have received some form of asylum in the country. According to Chinese 
authorities, Indochinese refugees are protected under the policy of “equal treatment, non-
discrimination, equal remuneration for equal work” and their “basic rights with regards to life, 
production, employment, education, medicare, etc. are fully guaranteed”.123  
6. CONCLUSION 
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This article is not intended to entirely dismiss the utility of refugee law advocacy in East Asia. 
The Refugee Convention remains the most well-known and influential set of norms for asylum-
seekers, and advocates should insist it is complied with in East Asia, as elsewhere. The Refugee 
Convention has already led to important legal reforms in East Asian countries. However, refugee 
law-based advocacy should not be overemphasised while neglecting to press for greater 
substantive and procedural protections for humanitarian status applicants, or improved treatment 
of humanitarian status holders. As argued in this article, international law provides appropriate 
and binding standards that can be used to advocate for progressive reforms in the region, and this 
type of advocacy would be more likely to have a successful outcome and affect large numbers of 
people than would a continued near-exclusive focus on the Refugee Convention.   
 
 
